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United States, China, Taiwan: 
A Precarious Triangle 
Murray Weidenbaum 
A Keynote Address to the Conference 
on the Greater China Economy 
St. Louis, Missouri 
March 25, 2000 
Whether Napoleon really said it or not, 
the forecast often attributed to him is likely 
to be essentially correct: "China is a sleep-
ing giant. When it wakes, it will move the 
world." China's 1.2 billion people combined 
with its record-breaking 20 years of rapid 
growth make it likely that the Middle King-
dom will become the second economic 
superpower sometime during the twenty-
first century. 
Nevertheless, an old Mandarin proverb 
states, "If you think you understand 
China, you don't really understand." That 
waming also sums up the challenges that 
face Americans in dealing with that fasci-
nating national array of strengths and 
weaknesses. When viewed separately, 
each of the many aspects of policy involv-
ing China is difficult-economic, political, 
military, and environmental. However, 
when we consider the many interrelation-
ships and then add the third part of the 
triangle-Taiwan-the policy challenges 
become increasingly complicated. Let us 
try to deal with this vital cluster of issues 
a step at a time. 
Murray Weidenbaum is chairman of the 
Center for the Study of American Business 
and Mallinckrodt Distinguished University 
Professor at Washington University in St. Louis. 
His book, Business and Government in the 
Global Marketplace, is in its sixth edition. 
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Economic Relations 
Let us begin with the economic rela-
tionships. Any way that we look at it, China 
is becoming an important economic power 
once again. Using a form of comparing 
national economies known as purchasing 
power parity, the Chinese economy is now 
more than half as large as that of the United 
States and larger than Japan's. More con-
ventional measures show China in seventh 
place, but coming up rapidly. 1 
China is now the ninth largest trading 
nation in the world. It is a major trading 
partner of the United States. More than $70 
billion of commerce flows each year between 
our two nations. But the term "partner," 
which President Clinton introduced into 
the public dialogue, is a misleading euphe-
mism for a very uneven set of commercial 
flows. The United States imports from 
China more than five times the dollar 
amount of our exports to them. This rela-
tionship is far more out of balance than 
our trade with Japan.2 Yet, unlike the case 
of Japan, most of the opposition to con-
tinuing normal trading relationships with 
China does not arise from those who be-
lieve they are hurt by the large excess of 
imports. Rather, it emanates from groups 
concerned primarily with non-economic 
factors, notably the harsh treatment of 
religious minorities, political dissidents, 
and Tibetans. 
Aside from low-priced clothing, toys, 
and electronic parts, trade with China is 
not a significant portion of the American 
economy. However, the United States is the 
destination of almost one-third of China's 
exports. Our commerce is a key way in 
which that nation acquires technology. Our 
trade also generates a substantial part of 
China's large accumulation of foreign cur-
rencies. China maintained a rapid rate of 
2 
economic growth while fmancial problems 
were besetting East Asia in 1997 and 1998. 
However, serious signs of weakness are 
visible, notably sluggish exports, stagnant 
industrial production, and inefficient state 
industries. 
Nevertheless, mainland China and Tai-
wan have been the two bright spots in an 
otherwise troubled East Asian economic 
scene. Despite the political difficulties, 
which I will cover in a moment, the eco-
nomic relationships across the Taiwan 
straits have remained strong and sub-
stantial. 
China is now the ninth largest 
trading nation in the world. It is 
a major trading partner of the 
United States. More than $70 
billion of commerce flows each 
year between our two nations. 
It is one of the great ironies of our time 
that so many of the people who fled the 
mainland in 1949-or their descendents-
have been returning to their ancestral 
home in a very special way. From Taiwan 
as well as elsewhere in the Chinese 
diaspora, they have brought with them 
much of the money and managerial skills 
that have been so essential to the economic 
success of China, especially in moving 
toward a modern capitalistic economy. 
Other indicators of the special nature of 
the cross-straits interrelationships are also 
impressive-the large numbers of tourists 
from Taiwan who visit the mainland, the 
rising number of telephone calls across the 
straits, as well as the numerous cultural 
and intellectual exchanges.3 
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Viewed from this side of the Pacific, the 
two sectors of Greater China seem extremely 
complementary, especially in an economic 
sense. The mainland possesses the land, 
the workforce, and increasingly a major 
market while Taiwan provides the entre-
preneurial and business skills enhanced 
by very substantial financial flows (over $40 
billion to date). According to Li-Lu, a 
Tiananmen Square student leader now in 
the United States, " ... business is the ulti-
mate force for democratic change in 
China."4 Apparently, this is a compelling 
truth whose power frightens much of the 
traditional communist leadership in China. 
Two-way trade between Taiwan and the 
mainland is now running at about $25 
billion a year. 
According to Li-Lu, a Ti.ananmen 
Square student leader now in 
the United States, tt ••• business is 
the ultimate force for democratic 
change in China." 
In contrast, the complementarities be-
tween the American and the Chinese 
economies, although considerable, are not 
nearly so great. Of course, some Americans 
barely restrain their enthusiasm when they 
consider a market potential in excess of 
1 billion customers. An example of this line 
of thinking was the late Ron Brown. When 
Secretary of Commerce, he declared, 
"China ... is the pot at the end of the rain-
bow."5 My own research leads me to a far 
more restrained conclusion. It is the rare 
U.S. company doing business in China that 
reports eaming profits on its operations in 
that nation. Rather, they like to talk about 
their rosy forecasts of future sales. 
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A recent survey of 96 multinationals 
operating in China reported that 62 percent 
had overestimated the market potential and 
an almost equal number (61 percent) had 
experienced poorer profit performance than 
they had expected. 6 Those percentages do 
leave room for some outstanding successes. 
Procter & Gamble dominates the market for 
soaps and shampoos. Coca-Cola far outsells 
Hainan coconut juice, and Ken-de-ji is well-
known in the larger cities (that's Kentucky 
Fried Chicken to Westemers). 
In contrast to the open U.S. market, 
numerous obstacles face American export-
ers to China, such as onerous licensing pro-
cedures. Compulsory registration applies to 
hundreds of products, typically electrical 
equipment and machinery. Moreover, U.S. 
producers of computer software, video 
tapes, compact discs, books, and motion 
pictures suffer because their products are 
frequently copied illegally in China. This 
intellectual piracy reduces potential U.S. 
exports to China and to the rest of the world 
by an estimated $2 billion a year.7 It also is 
a growing source of economic and political 
friction. "Piracy," it should be noted, is more 
of a Westem concept than an Asian one. 
Political Relations 
The political relationships between 
China and the United States are even more 
difficult to fathom than the economic. 
President Clinton described the state of 
Sino-U.S. ties as "a strategic partnership." 
Yet very few aspects of a true partnership 
are present. It is Japan that cooperates 
with us in a variety of important foreign 
policy activities, including financing a con-
siderable portion of the Gulf War. The two 
nations also share a common outlook toward 
democracy, private enterprise, and per-
sonal freedom. 
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On the other hand, there is no direct 
basis for confrontation between China and 
the United States. We do not share a com-
mon border nor do we hold competing 
claims for territory. However, significant 
differences in fundamental values are 
clearly visible in terms of the treatment of 
citizens by the govemment, especially in 
regard to personal freedoms-political, 
economic, and religious. 
The limited amount of individual liberty 
available in China galls many Americans. 
Especially upsetting is the persecution of 
Christian groups and the jailing of politi-
cal dissidents. It is difficult for the United 
States to accept the idea of a "partnership" 
with a nation that engages in such offen-
sive practices. 
On the positive side, in recent years 
China has relaxed the rules governing 
everyday life for the typical citizen. A sub-
stantial decentralization of power has 
taken place and greater latitude has been 
provided to private enterprise. The impacts 
ofWestem culture and commerce have been 
pervasive, especially in the larger cities. 
U.S. corporations doing business in 
China serve to advance our human rights 
goals. They create safer workplaces, follow 
more progressive personnel practices, raise 
living standards, and bring in new ideas, 
attitudes, and ways of thinking. American 
companies, such as Mattei, have adopted 
codes of conduct requiring local su bcon-
tractors and suppliers to avoid child labor 
and other practices inconsistent with U.S. 
standards.8 More indirectly, commercial 
products and advertising carry a powerful 
implicit message of personal choice. 
Substantial portions of China's popu-
lation recognize such American brand 
names as Coca-Cola, Jeep, Head and 
Shoulders, Marlboro, Mickey Mouse, and 
Kodak. Young women often wear miniskirts 
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and use Westem-style makeup. 
The role ofTaiwan adds significant com-
plication to the Sino-U.S. political relation-
ship. Officially, the United States recognizes 
the People's Republic and only maintains 
informal relations with Taipei. Our repeat-
edly stated national policy favors the vol-
untary unification of Taiwan into China, 
but also provides military support to the 
island in the event of force or the threat of 
force on the part of the PRC. To put it 
mildly, this is an unusual set of attitudes 
and commitments. Until recently, the U.S. 
position seemed to be reasonably workable 
and was consistent with the expansion of 
economic and cultural ties across the Tai-
wan straits. 
U.S. corporations doing business 
in China serve to advance our 
human rights goals. They create 
safer workplaces, follow more 
progressive personnel practices, 
raise living standards, and bring 
in new ideas, attitudes, and 
ways ofthinking. 
The situation became murkier when 
important groups in Taiwan began to talk 
about independence and its govemmental 
leader described relations between China 
and Taiwan as "state-to-state." The con-
cem is raised a notch when the PRC states 
that it is "under no obligation to commit 
itself to rule out the use of force" in secur-
ing the reunification of Taiwan and the 
mainland. 9 The frank discussions I have 
had in both China and Taipei convince me 
that this is an extremely difficult and sen-
7 
sitive situation calling for a maximum of 
restraint and patience on both sides. Surely, 
the continuing U.S. policy of engagement 
with China has also established an envi-
ronment in which Taiwan has flourished. 10 
When I have had background discus-
sions with Taipei leaders, I hear about 
their great success in achieving personal 
liberty and economic expansion for the 
island's citizens and the strong desire to 
keep those hard-won gains. My informal 
talks with mainland officials deal with 
other considerations, such as national 
pride and strategic matters. The two sets 
of representatives seem to be on different 
wavelengths. A meeting with the leaders 
of one large China city was especially 
memorable. Perhaps a bit naively, I stated 
with some enthusiasm that our national 
policy was to favor the attainment of a 
unified China-on a voluntary basis. 
The leader of the Chinese delegation 
promptly responded, "Tell me, when the 
South seceded from the Union, did you use 
force?" My answer frankly did not satisfy 
the Chinese officials, "Yes, but they fired 
first." In the high-tech twenty-first century 
that we have entered, it is possible to con-
jure up a new-style attack. For example, the 
PRC could use its large foreign exchange 
holdings to shake the Taiwan currency and 
stock markets in order to destabilize the 
island's political economy." 
Military Relations 
The military area generates great un-
certainty for American policymakers. China 
is in the midst of a major effort to upgrade 
its military capability. The acquisition from 
Russia of destroyers with supersonic mis-
siles is a cogent example. Is China moti-
vated by the desire for regional hegemony? 
Its imperious treatment of other nations 
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in some of the islands in the South China 
Sea is a source of considerable concern. 
The 1996 episode of China's missile test-
ing in the Taiwan straits surely raised ten-
sions in the region-as well as generating 
a strong and rapid American response. 
China presents little direct 
military threat to the United 
States, although it could be a 
substantial destabilizing force in 
East Asia. 
On the other hand, the current weapon 
procurement effort may be interpreted as 
defensive in nature. China's military capa-
bility is rudimentary compared to the 
United States. Its troops are poorly 
equipped by our standards, and their 
weapons, in the main, are considered to 
be obsolete. The Gulf War demonstrated 
that such large stockpiles of outdated 
equipment are of little use against a more 
advanced opponent. Moreover, China cur-
rently lacks the ability to project its power 
over water in any substantial way. It pos-
sesses a total of about 60 surface ships 
and fewer than 10 modern submarines. 12 
Thus, China presents little direct military 
threat to the United States, although it 
could be a substantial destabilizing force 
in East Asia. 
A less benign interpretation is also pos-
sible. China is procuring more sophisti-
cated aircraft, ships, and missiles from 
the cash-strapped countries of the former 
Soviet Union. Over the past decade, it has 
acquired several hundred SU-27 and SU-30 
fighter jets and Soveremenny-class destroy-
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ers with Sun bum missiles. 13 Ranked by 
explosive power, China's nuclear arsenal 
is reported to be the world's third largest, 
trailing only the United States and Rus-
sia. Chinese strategists may be working 
toward the day when their nuclear and 
missile forces can deter great power inter-
vention in the Asia/Pacific theater and their 
conventional forces can cow regional rivals. 
Such a combination would allow, indeed 
defme, local hegemony. 
At present, there seems to be little 
potential for extensive military action out-
side of an unintentional blunder into armed 
conflict. Taiwan quickly comes to mind in 
this connection, especially given the pros-
pect of a competitive presidential election 
campaign. China already focuses more of 
its military resources on Taiwan than on 
any other single area. In democracies, elec-
tions can be the occasion for a barrage of 
wild charges and promises, which could 
further exacerbate tensions across the Tai-
wan straits. On the other hand, China's 
desire for a strong military establishment 
may be understandable when viewed in 
the light of its long history of defeat and 
exploitation by foreign aggressors. Yet, over 
the centuries it has played that role itself 
in Southeast Asia. China's rising military 
capability does enable it to apply pressure 
on the rest of the region, thus perhaps 
affecting the military balance between 
China and its neighbors. 14 
Environmental Issues 
Environmental issues are a relatively 
new aspect of intemational relations, and 
one in which American and Chinese inter-
ests could readily collide. 15 The December 
1997 meeting in Kyoto on global climate 
change yielded a proposed treaty that 
would commit the United States and other 
10 
developed nations to major reductions in 
emissions of carbon dioxide (C02), which are 
generated primarily by using fossil fuels. The 
treaty, which requires Senate approval, 
would effectively exempt China and other 
developing countries from its tough restric-
tions. That basic difference in national 
treatment generates serious political diffi-
culties in the United States. The Senate 
has pledged to defeat any climate change 
treaty that does not include the developing 
nations. Reconciling the Senate position 
with the Kyoto agreement will focus heavily 
on the role of China, a prime emitter of C02 • 
Even though air pollution is a 
visibly serious problem (coal 
generates 75 percent of its 
energy}, China considers use of 
scarce resources for ecological 
purposes as a rich country's 
luxury. 
Poor countries like China believe that 
they cannot afford to sacrifice current in-
come to avoid the uncertain costs of en vi-
ronmental damage 50 or 100 years from 
now. Even though air pollution is a visibly 
serious problem (coal generates 75 percent 
of its energy), China considers use of scarce 
resources for ecological purposes as a rich 
country's luxury. Thus, trying to convince 
that nation to limit its energy consump-
tion while the major Westem countries use 
5 to 10 times as much per person will prob-
ably prove futile-unless wealthier coun-
tries such as the United States pay the 
global costs of reducing fossil fuel usage. 
Nevertheless, air pollution is a growing 
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problem in the major Chinese cities. China's 
extreme dependence on its domestic coal 
supply for energy also could generate other 
serious problems if it turns to less-pollut-
ing sources of energy. The vast and still 
mainly untapped oil and gas reserves of the 
South China Sea are an important poten-
tial alternate source of energy. Overlapping 
portions of that strategic area are also 
claimed by Vietnam, Malaysia, Brunei, the 
Philippines, and Taiwan. Furthermore, all 
ocean shipping among those six countries, 
as well as the transport of oil from the Per-
sian Gulf to Japan, takes place across the 
South China Sea. 
Reconciling Divergent Interests 
When asked the meaning of the French 
Revolution, Zhou Enlai was supposed to 
have replied, "It is too soon to tell." 16 In 
this vein, it is with some reluctance that I 
will try to pull together the various strands 
of Sino-U.S. connections. Policymakers in 
both the United States and China face 
fundamental challenges in attempting to 
deal simultaneously with a host of conten-
tious economic, political, social, religious, 
military, and environmental issues. 17 Not 
all of these serious matters can be solved 
soon. It would be sensible to focus on the 
highest priorities. 
A useful starting point is to note that 
China's isolation is ending. Today it is more 
open to the influences of Western culture 
and business practices than ever before. Its 
senior officials say they want their country 
to be a full participant in the world economy. 
They acknowledge that this requires China 
to move to a market economy and to mod-
ernize its society. Yet China is not now a 
member of key international organizations, 
formal and informal, such as the WTO and 
the annual economic summits. 
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The United States is in a special posi-
tion to aid China in its entry into the "club" 
of developed nations. Mter all, compared 
to European countries such as Britain, 
France, and Germany, the United States 
is one of the newer members of that club. 
We also have a major stake in China's suc-
cess in its effort to move out of its isola-
tionist setting. As a key Pacific power, it is 
to our benefit to encourage the rise of a 
China that interacts regularly with and is 
at peace with its neighbors. 
Not all American interests will benefit 
from China's entry into the WTO. Some 
investors will lose the preferential treat-
ment now accorded to foreigners. China's 
pledges to open its markets to foreign dis-
tribution channels are less than firm 
guarantees. On the other hand, China's 
membership in WTO may open the way 
to Taiwan's membership as a separate 
customs territory. 18 
In the broadest sense, China 
and the United States are 
complementary in terms oftheir 
basic economic needs and 
resources. 
In the broadest sense, China and the 
United States are complementary in terms 
of their basic economic needs and re-
sources. We are China's leading export 
market as well as the most logical part-
ner to help upgrade its technology through 
investment and joint venturing. In turn, 
China is the most promising new market 
for American business and agriculture. 
China's huge development and infra-
structure needs can provide enormous 
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export and investment opportunities for 
U.S. companies seeking geographic diver-
sification. In the important area of higher 
education, U.S. colleges and universities 
are a popular place for wealthier Chinese 
to send their children, especially for gradu-
ate education. Such activity has the added 
potential of generating personal and intel-
lectual bridges between the two nations. 
However, China's distance from the West 
is greater than a glance at the globe sug-
gests. Surely, the bombing of the Chinese 
offices in Belgrade, although presumably 
unintentional on our part, was at least a 
temporary setback in Sino-U.S. relations 
and we should be candid in acknowledging 
the consequences. Above and beyond such 
current events, central differences exist in 
historical experience, cultural orientation, 
and political and social institutions. To 
state the matter candidly, the rule oflaw as 
westemers view the notion is still essen-
tially a foreign concept in China, a special 
import that it seems to welcome with mini-
mum enthusiasm. Viewed in this light, let 
us see how we can deal with the main is-
sues that will either separate our two pow-
erful nations or bring them closer. 
It may be surprising for an economist 
to start with military rather than economic 
issues, but matters of war and peace are 
fundamental. The continued expansion of 
China's military power should be acknowl-
edged as potentially destabilizing. However, 
the sensible response is not to try to talk 
Beijing out of what it thinks is a reason-
able position. 
Instead, we should simply but clearly 
note that, in terms of our vital interests, 
the expansion of China's armed strength 
provides a compelling justification for the 
maintenance of a substantial U.S. military 
presence in East Asia. The United States 
maintains security alliances with Japan, 
14 
South Korea, the Philippines, Thailand, 
and Australia. Yet a China that is secure 
from foreign threat and can protect its 
legitimate sovereignty is desirable for both 
Asian and American vital interests. On the 
other hand, coercive pressure by China 
against its neighbors in the South China 
Sea or against Taiwan only serves to esca-
late tensions in East Asia. Alleviation of 
tensions requires restraint on the part of 
many parties. One expert in intemational 
law, for example, has urged Taiwan to "look 
like a state, act like a state ... but not for-
mally declare its independence."19 
To state the matter candidly, the 
rule of law as westerners view 
the notion is still essentially a 
foreign concept in China, a 
special import that it seems to 
welcome with minimum 
enthusiasm. 
Anyone who follows domestic political 
trends in the United States knows that 
strong pressure exists for devoting an in-
creasing share of the federal budget to 
domestic matters such as strengthening 
Social Security and Medicare. Our willing-
ness to assign a significant amount of our 
military resources to East Asia reflects the 
high priority that we give to stable condi-
tions in that region. At the same time, bet-
ter relations with China may allow the 
United States eventually to resume limited 
sales of defensive weapons to China. No 
action would do more to alleviate Beijing's 
fear of a policy of containment on our part. 
In the area of economic policy, the 
United States remains the main bulwark 
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of free flows of commerce and capital across 
the globe. Nevertheless, because we are a 
democracy, we respond to the concems of 
our citizens as expressed in the political 
process. Thus, when Chinese officials dis-
miss these concems as "just domestic poli-
tics," they demonstrate that they do not 
yet understand how a democracy works. 
In developing closer relations 
with China, tradeoffs are inevi-
table . ... Our government must 
balance concern for human 
rights against other important 
interests which also have signifi-
cant moral aspects-such as 
peace, national security, and 
prosperity of our citizens. 
It is extremely optimistic for China to 
expect that we can maintain a fully open 
market to their products in the face of so 
many adverse factors: (1) a host of Chi-
nese barriers to U.S. exports, (2) severe 
restraints on the operations of U.S. firms 
in China, (3) lack of a functioning legal 
system that provides local citizens as well 
as foreigners with essential protection of 
individual liberty and property, and (4) overt 
discrimination against and persecution of 
people that many Americans identify with. 
Nevertheless, it is counterproductive for 
us to try to tell China what to do under 
those circumstances. It is most appropri-
ate for the United States to clearly explain 
our position, motivation, and actions. We 
can sincerely hope that China continues 
to open up its economy-including the gen-
eral use of the intemet-and to achieve 
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more of the freedoms to which the citizens 
of other advanced societies have grown 
accustomed. The United States should 
support China's entry into the World Trade 
Organization-but without any special 
preferences. Judged strictly from the view-
point of American interests, the likelihood 
is that China will be a more responsible 
world citizen operating on the inside rather 
than the outside, but there are no firm 
assurances in such matters. 
However, if China chooses not to take 
more enlightened positions, it will postpone 
the time when it gains full membership in 
the global marketplace and the family of 
modem societies. Clearly our preference 
is to welcome China into that desirable 
relationship sooner rather than later. 
In developing closer relations with 
China, tradeoffs are inevitable. While pri-
vate organizations emphasizing single issues 
are free to take absolutist positions, it is 
foolish for govemments to do so. Our gov-
emment must balance concem for human 
rights against other important interests 
which also have significant moral aspects-
such as peace, national security, and pros-
perity of our citizens. 
The United States maintains peaceful 
and friendly relations with many nations 
that do not share our fundamental beliefs. 
But those relationships are not nearly as 
strong or as enduring. A virtuous circle is 
possible. Closer economic and individual 
ties in tum can lead to improved mutual 
understanding-and vice versa. Thus, we 
should welcome the development of im-
proved relations with China and further 
progress in the day-to-day interactions of 
our people. But we should be prepared for 
more pragmatic relationships and less 
happy outcomes. 
17 
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